NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

		TABLE OF CONTENTS		
$_{2}$	I.	INT	RODUCTION1	
3	II.	FAC	TUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1	
3		A.	The Relevant Parties	
4		B.	Facts Relating to CMV's Liability to EDC2	
5	III.	ARG	ARGUMENT5	
6		A.	EDC Has Complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c), and Local Rules 55-1 and 55-2.	
7		B.	The Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Dispute6	
8		C.	The <i>Eitel</i> Factors Support the Entry of a Default Judgment in Favor of EDC in the amount of \$239,731.867	
9			(i). The First <i>Eitel</i> Factor: the Possibility of Prejudice to EDC7	
10			(ii) The Second and Third <i>Eitel</i> Factors: the Merits of EDC's Claims and the Sufficiency of the Complaint8	
12			(a). As a Result of its Default, CMV is deemed to Have Admitted Liability for the Price of the Goods under the Controlling Provisions of the U.C.C8	
13			(b). As a Result of its Default, the CMV is deemed to Have Admitted Liability to EDC for Breach of Contract	
15			(iii) The Fourth <i>Eitel</i> Factor: The Amount of Money at Stake11	
16			(iv). The Fifth <i>Eitel</i> Factor: The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts	
17 18			(v). The Sixth <i>Eitel</i> Factor: Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect	
19			(vi). The Seventh <i>Eitel</i> Factor: The Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Favoring Decisions On The Merits12	
20		D.	EDC is entitled to Damages of \$239,731.86 against CMV12	
21	IV.	CON	ICLUSION13	
22			i	
			NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT HIDCMENT	

1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases 2 Alcalde v. NAC Real Estate Invs. & Assignments, Inc., 3 316 Fed. Appx. 661 (9th Cir. 2009)......10 Alco Std. Corp. v. Beauwood California, Inc., 4 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26029, *10-11 (C.D. Cal. 1986)......9 5 Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Crawford, 6 Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (C.D. Cal., 2002)......10 7 Philip Morris U.S.A. Inc. v. Castworld Prods., 8 Rawls v. Associated Materials, LLC, 9 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125744, *13 (S.D. W. Va. 2012)......9 TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 10 11 **Statutes** 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4)......6 12 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2)6 13 Cal. U. Com. Code § 2606(1)......8 14 Cal. U. Com. Code § 2606(1)(b)8 15 Cal. U. Com. Code § 2606(1)(c)......8 Cal. U. Com. Code § 2607.......9 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

EXPORT DEVELOPMENT CANADA ("EDC") HEREBY GIVES NOTICE to all parties and their attorneys of record that, on April 21, 2014, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, it will, and hereby does, move this Court, located at 255 East Temple Street, Los Angeles, California, for a default judgment against CMV Electric, Inc. ("CMV"), as set forth in the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities and proposed order. EDC moves for a default judgment on Counts I and II of its complaint for (1) the price of goods sold and delivered under Sections 2607(1) and 2709(1)(a) of the California Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), and (2) breach of contract. EDC seeks judgment for the sum of \$239,731.86, which includes \$178,308.38 in principal, \$53,745.35 in prejudgment interest through March 20, 2014, attorneys' fees in the amount of \$7,166.17, costs and expenses of \$511.97, and post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

EDC's motion is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, Rules 55-1 and 55-2 of the Local Civil Rules for the United States District Court for the Central District of California, and relevant case law, on the grounds that CMV has failed to answer or otherwise respond to EDC's complaint in this action.

The motion is based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the Declaration of Ryan Clark; the Declaration of David Mannion; the Appendix of

21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITES

I. INTRODUCTION

This Memorandum of Points and Authorities is respectfully submitted in support of the motion of plaintiff Export Development Canada ("EDC") for a default judgment against defendant CMV Electric, Inc. ("CMV") pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), and L. Civ. R. 55-1 and 55-2.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

"After a default has been entered by the court clerk, the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages." *Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Crawford*, 226 F.R.D. 388, 392 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (*citing, TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, the following facts are taken from EDC's complaint, except those relating to damages which are set forth in the Declarations of Ryan Clark and David Mannion.

A. The Relevant Parties.

EDC is a Canadian Crown corporation established by the Canadian Export

Development Act of 1985. *See*, EDC's Complaint attached as Exhibit 1 to the

Accompanying Appendix of Exhibits ("Appendix"), at ¶ 12; Clark Decl., ¶ 2. EDC

provides insurance coverage against non-payment to Canadian exporters selling goods

on credit to buyers in the United States. Exh. 1, ¶ 14. CMV is an electrical contractor
that performs work relating to traffic infrastructure projects. *Id.*, ¶ 15. Non-party

International Road Dynamics, Inc. ("International") is a Canadian corporation that 1 designs, engineers, and sells equipment for use in projects relating to traffic control 2 and toll management. Id., ¶ 16. Non-party Caltrans is a division of the California 3 Department of Transportation that manages California's highways and freeways. Id., 4 ¶ 17. 5 Facts Relating to CMV's Liability to EDC. В. 6 CMV entered into a contract to provide traffic management equipment in 7 8 relation to Caltrans project number 08-497504 located in the County of San Bernardino (the "Caltrans Project"). Appendix, Exh. 1, ¶ 18. In turn, CMV entered 9 10 into a subcontract with International to provide certain traffic management equipment for the Caltrans Project. *Id.*, ¶ 19. 11 12 13 14

Specifically, on or about January 27, 2012, CMV issued purchase order number 3690-354 to International (the "P.O."). Id., ¶ 20. The P.O. requested International to provide: (1) bending-plate weigh-pads with frames, lead cable, and epoxy 4 lanes at a price of \$120,000; (2) a plezo-electric sensor with lead cable and grout at a price of \$500; (3) WIM (Weigh-in-Motion) electronics at a price of \$25,000; (4) a portable computer at a price of \$500; and (5) supervision of WIM installation and calibration at a price of \$19,000. Id., ¶ 21. International duly delivered these items (the "Goods") to CMV. Id., ¶ 22.

International then issued three invoices to CMV for the price of the Goods, as follows: (1) invoice no. 62554B dated May 7, 2012, for the sum of \$157,853.75; (2)

21

15

16

17

18

19

invoice no. 62571B dated May 7, 2012, for the sum of \$1,454.63; and (3) invoice no. 62808 dated August 31, 2012, for the sum of \$19,000 (collectively, the "Invoices"). Id., ¶ 26. Payment of the Invoices was due within thirty (30) days of the invoice date. Id., ¶ 27. CMV received the Invoices and did not object to them. Id., ¶ 28.

Each of International's Invoices provided that "[i]nterest of 1.5% monthly will be charged on Overdue Accounts." *Id.*, ¶ 31. Payment of the first two invoices was due on June 6, 2012. *Id.*, ¶ 32. CMV is liable for payment of the first two invoices in the aggregate sum of \$159,308.38, together with interest at the rate of 1.5% per month from June 6, 2012. Clark Decl., ¶ 4. Payment of the third invoice was due on September 30, 2012. *See*, Exh. 1, at ¶ 34. CMV is liable for payment of the third invoice in the sum of \$19,000, together with interest at the rate of 1.5% per month from September 30, 2012. Clark Decl., ¶ 4.

In addition, Article 5 of the P.O. contained the following attorneys' fee provision:

In the event the parties become involved in litigation...with each other, arising out of this p.o. shall be fully compensated (sic.) for the cost of its participation in such proceedings, including the cost incurred for attorney fees and expense fees. Exh. 1, at ¶ 36.

On or about October 1, 2012, CMV made a partial payment of \$2,500 to International for the Goods. Clark Decl., ¶ 6. Prior to the commencement of this action, International assigned all right, title, and interest in its claims against CMV relating to the Goods to Plaintiff. *See*, Appendix, Exh. 1, ¶ 5; Exh. 2, sections 1-2. As

	1
	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
1	0
1	1
1	2
1	3
1	4
1	5
1	6
1	7
1	8
1	9
2	0

of March 20, 2014, CMV is liable to EDC for \$239,731.86, which includes
\$178,308.38 in principal, \$53,745.35 in prejudgment interest through March 20, 2014
(after subtracting the \$2,500 partial payment), attorneys' fees in the amount of
\$7,166.17, and costs and expenses of \$511.97. Clark Decl., $\P\P$ 4, 6; Mannion Decl., \P
2; Appendix, Exhibits 1 and 3.

As shown by the emails attached at Exhibit 4 to the Appendix, CMV has been fully aware of this action since it was filed. Settlement communications have been redacted from the aforementioned emails. CMV's emails were sent by Jennie Davis, whose signature indicates that she is the "manager" of CMV. In addition, Carlos Villegas is copied on those emails. Records on file with the California Secretary of State indicate that Mr. Villegas is CMV's registered agent for the service of process. See, Appendix, Exh. 5.

Moreover, on March 19, 2014, EDC's counsel informed CMV of EDC's intention to file this motion for a default judgment. Exh. 4, at p. 2. Microsoft Outlook "read-receipts" were received from both Mr. Villegas and Ms. Davis for that email. *Id.*, pp. 1-2.

22

¹ Due to an arithmetic error, that email overstated the amount of the default judgment EDC was seeking. Mannion Decl., ¶ 9.

III. ARGUMENT

A default judgment may be awarded "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend" the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

A. EDC Has Complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c), and Local Rules 55-1 and 55-2.

"The FRCP and the local rules in the Central District of California require that applications for default judgment set forth the following information: (1) when and against which party default was entered; (2) the identification of the pleadings to which default was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is an infant or incompetent person, and if so, whether that person is adequately represented; (4) that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 does not apply; and (5) that notice of the application has been served on the defaulting party, if required." *Philip Morris U.S.A. Inc. v. Castworld Prods.*, 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003).

EDC filed its complaint against CMV on January 29, 2014. Appendix, Exh. 1. The complaint was served on CMV by personal service on January 30, 2014, pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(a). Proof of service was filed with the Court on February 10, 2014. *See*, Appendix, Exh. 6. To date, CMV has failed to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. Mannion Decl., ¶ 3.

EDC obtained a Certificate of Default against CMV from the Clerk of the Court on March 13, 2014. *See*, Appendix, Exh. 7. EDC's counsel emailed a copy of the

Certificate of Default to CMV the same day it was entered. See, Appendix, Exh. 4, at p. 3. Because EDC is not requesting relief that differs from or exceeds that sought in the complaint, this motion complies with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) ("A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings."). Although not required to do so under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) since CMV has not appeared, EDC has served a copy of this motion on CMV by first class mail and email. Mannion Decl., ¶ 10. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that EDC has satisfied the procedural requirements for the entry of a default judgment.

В. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Dispute.

EDC is a Canadian Crown corporation and its headquarters are located in Canada. Clark Decl., ¶ 2. Its shares are held in trust for Queen Elizabeth II pursuant to § 11(3) of the Canadian Export Development Act. As such, EDC is a "citizen[] or subject[] of a foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) or, alternatively, a "foreign state" as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).

CMV is a California corporation with its principal place of business located in Upland, California. See, Appendix, Exh. 5. In addition, the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. As such, the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), or – insofar as EDC is deemed to be a "foreign state" – under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4).

C. The *Eitel* Factors Support the Entry of a Default Judgment in Favor of EDC in the amount of \$239,731.86.

Having met the procedural requirements for the entry of a default judgment, "[t]he district court's decision whether to grant or deny a default judgment is discretionary in nature." *Elektra Entm 't Group Inc. v. Crawford*, 226 F.R.D. 388, 392 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[f]actors which may be considered by courts in exercising discretion as to the entry of a default judgment include:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. *Eitel v. McCool*, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-1472 (9th Cir. 1986).

(i). The First Eitel Factor: the Possibility of Prejudice to EDC.

As far as EDC is aware, no person or entity other than CMV is liable for the price of the Goods. Mannion Decl., ¶ 11. As such, EDC will be prejudiced unless a default judgment is entered because it has no other known source for recovery. *Cf.*, *Philip Morris*, 219 F.R.D., at 499 ("With respect to the first *Eitel* factor, Plaintiff would suffer prejudice if the default judgment is not entered because Plaintiff would be without other recourse for recovery.").

(ii) The Second and Third *Eitel* Factors: the Merits of EDC's Claims and the Sufficiency of the Complaint.

"With regard to the second and third factors, the plaintiff is required to state a claim on which the [plaintiff] may recover." *Elektra Entm't*, 226 F.R.D., at 392 (internal quotations and citations omitted, alteration in original). Here, EDC seeks the entry of a default judgment with respect to Counts I and II of its complaint for (1) the price of the Goods under Sections 2607(1) and 2709(1)(a) of the California Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), and (2) breach of contract. It is respectfully submitted that EDC has stated a claim on which it can recover for both Counts.

(a). As a Result of its Default, CMV is deemed to Have Admitted Liability for the Price of the Goods under the Controlling Provisions of the U.C.C.

Under the U.C.C. "[t]he buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted." *Cal. U. Com. Code* § 2607(1). "Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer...fails to make an effective rejection..." *Cal. U. Com. Code* § 2606(1)(b). International delivered the Goods to CMV. Appendix, Exh. 1, at ¶ 22. CMV accepted the Goods (*id.*, ¶ 23) but failed to pay International. *Id.*, ¶ 24. In addition, CMV has never raised any disputes about the quality of the Goods. *Id.*, ¶ 29. As such, CMV is deemed to have accepted the Goods under *Cal. U. Com. Code* § 2606(1)(b).

Alternatively, CMV is deemed to have accepted the Goods under *Cal. U. Com.*Code § 2606(1)(c) ("Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer...does any act

inconsistent with the seller's ownership[.]"). The Goods were installed at, and incorporated into, the Caltrans Project. *Id.*, ¶ 25. As such, CMV performed acts inconsistent with International's ownership of the Goods. Thus, it is incontrovertible that CMV "accepted" the Goods (*Cal. U. Com. Code* § 2606(1)) and, as a result, is obligated to pay for them (*Cal. U. Com. Code* § 2607(1)).

As explained in Official Comment No. 2 to *Cal. U. Com. Code* § 2607, "acceptance of goods precludes their subsequent rejection. Any return of the goods thereafter must be by way of revocation of acceptance, under the next section"; *i.e.*, *Cal. U. Com. Code* § 2608. *Cf.*, *Rawls v. Associated Materials*, *LLC*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125744, *13 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) ("[R]ejection of goods occurs, if at all, before acceptance of goods, and revocation of acceptance of goods occurs, if at all after acceptance of goods.").

Summarizing the revocation analysis, the District Court has held as follows:

Acceptance of goods gives the seller a right to recover the price from the buyer. Section 2607(1). However, a buyer may revoke acceptance if: (1) there is a substantial nonconformity in the goods; (2) the nonconformity is difficult to discover; (3) the revocation occurs within a reasonable time; **and** (4) the revocation occurs 'before any substantial change in condition of goods which is not caused by their own defects.' Section 2608. *Alco Std. Corp. v. Beauwood California, Inc.*, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26029, *10-11 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (emphasis added).

CMV failed to make a timely and effective revocation of its acceptance of the Goods. Appendix, Exh. 1, at \P 42. Moreover, because the Goods were installed in the

. ||

Caltrans Project (id., ¶ 25) and their quality is undisputed (id., ¶ 29), CMV could not revoke its acceptance under any circumstances.

(b). As a Result of its Default, the CMV is deemed to Have Admitted Liability to EDC for Breach of Contract.

"A claim for breach of contract under California law consists of the following elements: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant; and (4) damage resulting from the breach." *Alcalde v. NAC Real Estate Invs. & Assignments, Inc.*, 316 Fed. Appx. 661, 662 (9th Cir. 2009). It is respectfully submitted that EDC has properly pled the elements of this claim.

In addition to the detailed factual allegations set forth in Point II, supra, EDC's complaint alleges that: (1) the agreement by CMV to pay International for the Goods was a valid and binding contract (Exh. 1, ¶ 45); (2) International fully performed under the terms of the agreement (Exh. 1, ¶ 46); (3) CMV has never raised any disputes about the quality of the Goods (Exh. 1, ¶¶ 29, 47); (4) CMV materially breached the terms of the agreement by refusing to pay for the Goods (Exh. 1, ¶ 48); and (5) as a direct and proximate result of CMV's breach of its agreement to pay for the Goods, EDC has been damaged (Exh. 1, ¶ 49).

In sum, CMV's nonappearance is an admission that it is liable for the balance of the Goods, as set forth in the Invoices, together with interest at the rate of 18% per annum, plus attorneys' fees and costs. *Elektra Entm't*, 226 F.R.D., at 392 ("After a

default has been entered by the court clerk, the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages.").

(iii) The Fourth *Eitel* Factor: The Amount of Money at Stake.

With respect to this factor, "the court must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant's conduct." *Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans*, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 (C.D. Cal., 2002). As discussed above, EDC is seeking a default judgment for \$239,731.86 against CMV. Since CMV is deemed to have failed to pay for the Goods without any excuse, and also chose not to "comply with the judicial process or to participate in any way in the present litigation," the "imposition of a substantial monetary award" is justified. *Cf.*, *Philip Morris*, 219 F.R.D., at 500.

(iv). The Fifth *Eitel* Factor: The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts.

CMV's failure to respond to the complaint indicates that "the likelihood that any genuine issue may exist is, at best, remote." *Philip Morris*, 219 F.R.D., at 500; *Elektra Entm't*, 226 F.R.D., at 393 (same).

(v). The Sixth *Eitel* Factor: Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect.

CMV is fully aware this action is pending (*see*, Appendix, Exh. 4) and has consciously decided not to appear. As such, CMV's default is due to "willful disobedience" of the summons and not excusable neglect. *Cf.*, *Philip Morris*, 219 F.R.D., at 500-501; *Elektra Entm 't*, 226 F.R.D. at 393.

(vi). The Seventh *Eitel* Factor: The Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Favoring Decisions On The Merits.

"[T]he mere existence of Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) indicates that the seventh *Eitel* factor is not alone dispositive." *Philip Morris*, 219 F.R.D., at 501. Moreover, CMV's conscious failure to answer EDC's complaint "makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible." *Id.* "Under FRCP 55(a), termination of a case before hearing the merits is allowed whenever a defendant fails to defend an action." *Ibid.* Like in *Philip Morris*, "[t]his is precisely what occurred in the present case. Therefore, the seventh *Eitel* factor does not preclude the Court from entering default judgment against Defendant." 219 F.R.D., at 501.

D. EDC is entitled to Damages of \$239,731.86 against CMV.

A "[p]laintiff's burden in 'proving up' damages is relatively lenient." *Philip Morris*, 219 F.R.D., at 498. "If proximate cause is properly alleged in the complaint, it is admitted upon default." *Id.* "Injury is established and plaintiff need prove only that the compensation sought relates to the damages that naturally flow from the injuries pled." *Ibid.*

As set forth above, EDC has properly alleged a claim for the price of the Goods under the U.C.C. or, alternatively, a claim for breach of contract. As of March 20, 2014, CMV is liable to EDC for \$239,731.86, which includes \$178,308.38 in principal, \$53,745.35 in prejudgment interest through March 20, 2014 (after subtracting the \$2,500 partial payment), attorneys' fees in the amount of \$7,166.17,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES